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Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse
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Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL,Investigation of March 15. 2018 Pedestrian Bridge,Collapse at Florida,International University. Report prepared by,Mohammad Ayub PE SE,Director Office of Engineering Services. Directorate of Construction,OSHA National Office,Washington D C. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL,TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE NO.
1 Executive Summary 9,2 Introduction 13,3 Key Participants 16. 4 Description of Construction 18,5 Peer review 36,6 The cracks 39. 7 The collapse 83,8 Structural analysis 103,9 Structural design deficiencies 106. 10 Conclusions 113, The executive summary and conclusions of the June 2019 Report has been amended see pages 12 114. The Peer review section of the June 2019 Report has been amended see page 37. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL,LIST OF FIGURES.
Figure 1 Location of the bridge 13,Figure 2 Flow chart of the organization 17. Figure 3 Bridge as designed 18,Figure 4 Construction sequence 19. Figure 5 Main span truss PT bar details 20,Figure 6 Construction of the main span 21. Figure 7 Transportation of the main span 22, Figure 8 Bracing plan of the north end of the main span 25. Figure 9 Bracing of the north end of the main span 26. Figure 10 Cross section of the bridge main span deck 29. Figure 11 Main span deck end diaphragm and the post tensioning tendons 30. Figure 12 Main span deck longitudinal tendon ducts 31. Figure 13 Diaphragm II reinforcement 33,Figure 14 Concrete testing report 35.
Figure 15 Photo 1 in 2 28 2018 E mail from MCM to FIGG 40. Figure 16 Photo 2 in 2 28 2018 E mail from MCM to FIGG 41. Figure 17 Photo 3 in 2 28 2018 E mail from MCM to FIGG 42. Figure 18 Photo 4 in 2 28 2018 E mail from MCM to FIGG 43. Figure 19 Photo 5 in 2 28 2018 E mail from MCM to FIGG 44. Figure 20 Photo 6 in 2 28 2018 E mail from MCM to FIGG 45. Figure 21 Location of cracks in 2 28 2018 E mail from MCM to FIGG as per BPA 46. Figure 22 North end of the main span truss during transportation generally free of cracks 47. Figure 23 Screenshot of Kevin Hanson s message to Sam Nunez on March 10 2018 49. Figure 24 Cracks at the west side diaphragm II MCM email of 3 12 2018 top face by BPA 51. Figure 25 Cracks at the west side diaphragm II MCM email of 3 12 2018 by BPA side face 52. Figure 26 Cracks at the east side diaphragm II MCM email of 3 12 2018 by BPA top face 53. Figure 27 Cracks on the east side diaphragm II MCM email of 3 12 2018 by BPA side face 54. Figure 28 Diagonal cracks on the west side of diaphragm II on 3 13 2018 by BPA top face 57. Figure 29 Close up of cracks at the west side of diaphragm II on 3 13 2018 by BPA 58. Figure 30 Notice the depth and width of diagonal cracks at the west side of diaphragm II on. 3 14 2018 by BPA 59, Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL, Figure 31 Notice the depth and width of cracks near column 12 at the west side of diaphragm II. on 3 14 2018 by BPA 60, Figure 32 Cracks at the construction joint of the main span deck and diagonal 11 on 3 13 2018. Figure 33 Cracks at the construction joint of the main span deck and diagonal 11 on 3 13 2018. Figure 34 Cracks at the construction joint of the main span deck and diagonal 11 on 3 13 2018. Figure 35 Cracks at the construction joint of the main span deck diagonal 11 and the chamfer of. diagonal 11 on 3 13 2018 by BPA 64, Figure 36 Cracks at the construction joint of the main span deck and diagonal 11 on 3 13 2018. Figure 37 Cracks at the construction joint of the main span deck and diagonal 11 on 3 13 2018. Figure 38 Cracks at the construction joint of the main span deck and diagonal 11 on 3 13 2018. Figure 39 Close up of longitudinal cracks in diagonal 11 on 3 14 2018 by BPA 68. Figure 40 Close up of longitudinal cracks in diagonal 11 on 3 13 2018 by BPA 69. Figure 41 Close up of longitudinal cracks in diagonal 11 on 3 13 2018 by BPA 70. Figure 42 Cracks at the west side of diaphragm II on 3 14 2018 by BPA 71. Figure 43 Cracks at the east side diaphragm II on 3 10 2018 top face by Corradino 72. Figure 44 Cracks and movement of the column at the east side of diaphragm II on 3 14 2018 by. Figure 45 Note the gap indicative of movement between sleeve pipe and concrete pictured on. 3 13 2018 by BPA 80, Figure 46 Bridge immediately prior to the collapse March 15 2018 camera 1 85.
Figure 47 Bridge immediately after the collapse March 15 2018 camera 1 86. Figure 48 Bridge immediately prior to the collapse March 15 2018 camera 2 87. Figure 49 Bridge immediately after the collapse March 15 2018 camera 2 88. Figure 50 Bridge immediately prior to the collapse March 15 2018 camera 3 89. Figure 51 Bridge immediately after the collapse March 15 2018 camera 3 90. Figure 52 Column 12 diagonal 11 and part of the canopy after bridge deck and diaphragm fell to. the ground March 17 2018 by OSHA 91, Figure 53 Northernmost blister and hydraulic jack attached to the lower PT bar of diagonal 11. after bridge collapse side view March 17 2018 by OSHA 91. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL, Figure 54 Northernmost blister and hydraulic jack attached to the lower PT bar of diagonal 11. after bridge collapse front view March 17 2018 by OSHA 92. Figure 55 Northernmost blister and pressure gauge March 17 2018 by OSHA 92. Figure 56 Hydraulic pump for post tensioning after bridge collapse March 17 2018 by OSHA93. Figure 57 Lower PT separated from the diagonal 11 still embedded in diaphragm after bridge. collapse March 17 2018 by OSHA 93, Figure 58 Concrete blow out failure in Diaphragm II at the time of bridge collapse at the site. looking north from south March 21 2018 by OSHA 94, Figure 59 Concrete blow out failure in Diaphragm II at the time of bridge collapse at the site. looking north from south March 21 2018 by OSHA 94, Figure 60 Concrete blow out failure in Diaphragm II at the time of bridge collapse at the site.
looking north from south March 21 2018 by OSHA 95, Figure 61 Remnants of diaphragm II at the time of the bridge collapse in the storage yard. looking north from south April 9 2018 by OSHA 95, Figure 62 Concrete blow out failure in Diaphragm II at the time of bridge collapse in the storage. yard looking north from south April 9 2018 by OSHA 96. Figure 63 Blow out hole in Diaphragm II at the time of the bridge collapse in the storage yard. looking north from south April 9 2018 by OSHA 96, Figure 64 Punched hole in Diaphragm II at the time of the bridge collapse from south looking. towards north April 9 2018 by OSHA 97, Figure 65 Punched hole in Diaphragm II at the time of the bridge collapse from south looking. towards north April 9 2018 by OSHA 97, Figure 66 Punched hole in Diaphragm II at the time of the bridge collapse from south looking.
towards north April 9 2018 by OSHA 98, Figure 67 Punched hole in Diaphragm II at the time of the bridge collapse from south looking. towards north April 9 2018 by OSHA 98, Figure 68 Punched hole in Diaphragm II at the time of the bridge collapse from south looking. towards north April 9 2018 by OSHA 99, Figure 69 Punched hole in Diaphragm II at the time of the bridge collapse from south looking. towards north April 9 2018 by OSHA 99, Figure 70 Punched hole in Diaphragm II at the time of the bridge collapse from south looking. towards north April 9 2018 by OSHA 100, Figure 71 Side view of the saved portion of the diaphragm II in storage yard April 9 2018 by.
Figure 72 Aerial view of the collapsed bridge March 15 18 2018 101. Figure 73 South end of the bridge after collapse looking west 101. Figure 74 South end of the bridge after collapse looking east 102. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL,Figure 75 Vehicles crushed by falling bridge 102. Figure 76 Overview of the main span truss system model 105. Figure 77 Construction joint detail at diagonal 11 and deck 106. Figure 78 Potential line of crack plan view 111, Figure 79 Potential Punching shear failure at north end plan view 112. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL,LIST OF TABLES. Table 1 PT schedule Main span deck 30,Table 2 Truss member details Main span 33. Table 3 Main span PT pre stressed dates deck and canopy 34. Table 4 Main span PT pre stressed dates diagonal members 34. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL,1 Executive Summary.
On March 15 2018 at approximately 1 45 p m a pedestrian bridge under construction in. Miami Florida collapsed One employee and five motorists were fatally injured and another. employee permanently disabled when the bridge fell as the motorists waited for the traffic light. underneath the bridge and as the employees were performing work activities on top of the bridge. structure The bridge at the present stage of construction consisted of a single concrete truss. spanning approximately 174 feet and weighing approximately 930 tons It was placed over the. piers just five days prior to the collapse An adjoining span of concrete truss was to be. constructed next over the canal to make a continuous bridge of 289 feet The concrete bridge. was cast at a nearby off site location using what is known as Accelerated Bridge Construction. ABC and then transported to its final location ABC provides minimal traffic disruption The. bridge was financed through federal grants and constructed at the campus of Florida. International University FIU in Miami The FIU project was a class A Local Agency Program. LAP project The bridge would connect the FIU campus with the City of Sweetwater where. many FIU students reside, The incident was extensively covered by live television and print media The Occupational. Safety and Health Administration OSHA sent officials from the agency s Fort Lauderdale Area. Office and a forensic structural engineer from the OSHA Directorate of Construction Office of. Engineering Services OES in Washington D C to determine the cause of the collapse and. whether industry or OSHA standards were violated During the first week of investigation. OSHA maintained a 24 hour surveillance at the incident site OSHA worked closely with the. National Transportation Safety Board NTSB and local officials inspecting the remnants of the. fallen bridge and interviewing contractors to determine construction activities preceding the. OSHA conducted numerous interviews reviewed pertinent construction documents and. structural computations performed by the structural engineer of record EOR examined the. failed pieces conducted its own structural analysis and viewed hundreds of photographs of the. bridge taken before and after the collapse, Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL, We thank the OSHA Fort Lauderdale Area Office particularly Assistant Area Director Juan. Torres and Compliance Officer Anthony Campos for their untiring effort and dedication Alan. Lu Ph D PE performed finite element analysis and Bryan Ewing Ph D PE performed hand. computations both of our office We thank NTSB and all the NTSB field staff for their steadfast. co operation during OSHA s investigation, As a result of the investigation OES concludes that. 1 FIGG Bridge Engineers FIGG the Engineer of Record EOR failed to recognize that. the bridge was in danger of collapsing when it inspected it hours before the collapse The. concrete truss had developed numerous wide and deep structural cracks jeopardizing the. integrity of the bridge The EOR should have immediately instructed that the bridge be. shored at appropriate locations and SW 8th Street be closed At the time of collapse the. post tensioning bars were being re tensioned at the specific instructions of the EOR. 2 The bridge had structural design deficiencies that contributed to the collapse during. construction stage III The cracks on the bridge occurred due to deficient structural. 3 The morning of the incident EOR held a meeting with project participants after. evaluating the cracks over the course of the previous two days At that meeting the EOR. acknowledged that his computations could not replicate the cracks and therefore he did. not know why the cracks were occurring The Construction Engineer and Inspector. CEI of the project advised the EOR at this meeting that the cracks were lengthening. daily Despite these admissions and the knowledge that the cracks were growing in size. EOR stated more than once that the cracks did not present any safety concerns. 4 The magnitude of the cracks warranted that SW 8th Street be immediately closed and the. concrete truss be shored and supported at multiple intermediate locations to reduce the. loads in the north diagonal and the node until final evaluations were done and remedial. measures implemented, 5 Networking Engineering Services Inc dba Bolton Perez and Associates Inc BPA was.
retained by FIU to be the CEI of the project BPA failed to classify the cracks which. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL, were structural in nature in accordance with the Florida Department of Transportation. FDOT requirements BPA as a CEI was expected to exercise its own independent. professional judgement in accordance with their contract with FIU and FDOT. requirements With intimate knowledge of extensive cracking on the bridge BPA failed. to recognize that the bridge was in danger of collapsing and did not recommend to FIU. MCM or others to close the street and shore the bridge regardless of the opinion held by. 6 Munilla Construction Management Inc MCM the design build contractor was aware. that the cracks were getting larger as reported by MCM superintendent and quality. control personnel on March 12 and 14 2018 On March 13 2018 EOR stated in an. email to MCM among the list of facts that since Saturday March 10 2018 MCM has. been monitoring the cracks and they have not grown in size MCM should have. immediately informed EOR on March 14 2018 that this assumption was not valid. Despite this oversight on the part of MCM EOR was provided with photographs and. measurements of the cracks in the days leading up to the collapse and was specifically. informed by BPA during the morning meeting on March 15 2018 that the cracks were. lengthening, 7 MCM the design build contractor deferred to the decision of EOR and failed to exercise. its own independent professional judgement as a constructor of the bridge to close the. traffic on SW 8th Street until the cause of the cracks were conclusively determined by. EOR and peer reviewed MCM had extensive construction experience in concrete. structures and had intimate knowledge of the magnitude of cracks which were growing. in size daily MCM s deference to EOR in light of the conclusion No 6 above and. failure to exercise their own independent judgment with regard to implementing. necessary safety measures were unreasonable, 8 The evaluations of the cracks by EOR and his recommendation to re tension the post. tensioning bars of diagonal 11 were not included in the original design and therefore. should have been subject to peer review, 9 The consultant retained by EOR to conduct independent peer review of the EOR s. design as per FDOT requirements did not check the structural integrity of the bridge. under different construction stages a violation of the FDOT requirements The. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL, independent check was performed only under the final design stage when all segments of.
the bridge were constructed and completed, 10 EOR should have known that the consultant who conducted the peer review did not check. the structural design of the truss design at stage III as required by FDOT meriting extra. safety precautions by EOR, 11 EOR should have known that the truss was a non redundant structure and if one diagonal. member failed the entire bridge could collapse Given the nature and extent of the. cracking and the non redundancy of the bridge design necessary safety precautions. should have included closing the roadway below the bridge and immediately providing. shoring to the bridge at suitable locations until a complete evaluation was done. Note This page has been amended by deleting the following sentence from the June 2019. report EOR failed to provide construction documents to Louis Berger at 30 60 and 90. of completion of construction documents in accordance with the FDOT requirements. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL,2 Introduction. The Florida International University in Miami is one of the largest campuses in the United. States A project called UniversityCity Prosperity Project was created by FIU to improve the. infrastructure of the campus The project among other things included the construction of a. pedestrian bridge over the SW 8th Street near SW 109th Avenue to facilitate movement of. students from the adjoining City of Sweetwater to the FIU campus as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 Location of the bridge,Courtesy of Google Map. In this regard FIU signed a series of agreements Florida Department of Transportation FDOT. placed the FIU UniversityCity Prosperity project under the Local Agency Program LAP FIU. and FDOT signed the LAP agreement in June 2013 Another agreement was signed between. FIU and the U S Department of Transportation USDOT and Federal Highway Administration. FHWA under the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery TIGER. program The federal TIGER grants represented a majority of the funds provided for the 19. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL, million project The LAP agreement was amended at the request of FIU to reflect the substantial.
project completion date to January 2019 and completion of the project by February 2019. FIU retained TY Lin International TY Lin a construction engineering company to prepare. design criteria and conceptual drawings for the pedestrian bridge project The criteria was. completed in April 2015 FIU advertised the project as a design build project The design. criteria emphasized in great length to the prospective bidders the desired aesthetic aspect of the. pedestrian bridge The list of criteria included, The structure is also an opportunity to be a landmark for the campus and serve as a gateway. into western Miami Dade County from Florida turnpike. The structure should function as more than just a path for circulation It should be a place to be. experienced and the FIU Campus and its students must be proud of it It should be a destination. in its own right where community members might linger gather and create an urban social. space linear park, The design criteria also stated that The bridge superstructure should be primarily structural. steel with concrete walking surface The design should avoid use of non redundant fracture. critical members Emphasis ours Steel structure was not a requirement in the design criteria. but certainly a preference due to inherent steel s ductility properties Further discussion of the. redundancy of the structure will follow in subsequent sections of this report. A selection committee consisting of FIU officials City of Sweetwater and FDOT was. established TY Lin was not included in the selection committee FIU received two proposals. one from Munilla Construction Management Inc MCM and the other from Facchina. Construction Co Inc both from Florida MCM teamed with FIGG Bridge Engineers FIGG of. Tallahassee as a sub contractor FIGG was the Engineer of Record EOR The selection. committee was impressed by the rendering of the MCM FIGG proposal that depicted a bridge. with a single line of truss members also of concrete and a wide bottom concrete deck and a. concrete canopy The bridge was similar to a cable stayed bridge with plenty of walking surface. and socializing area on the bridge deck With night lighting and illumination it would have. become a milestone in the area The proposal also employed the use of Accelerated Bridge. Investigation of March 15 2018 Pedestrian Bridge Collapse. at Florida International University Miami FL, Construction ABC technique which is researched and promoted at the FIU University. Transportation Center The selection committee selected the MCM FIGG proposal primarily for. its aesthetic considerations The selection was sent to FDOT and FHWA for approval which. was promptly granted in November 2015, FIU awarded the contract to MCM in December 2015 FIU issued the notice to proceed to MCM. in January 2016 As stated earlier MCM retained FIGG Bridge Engineers Inc of Tallahassee. FL to perform structural design of the bridge and manage other professionals to be retained by. FIGG to design civil mechanical electrical plumbing etc Notice to proceed was given to. FIGG by MCM in January 2016 when the structural design work began MCM and FIGG signed. the contract in April 2016 FIGG had no direct contract with FIU During the design phase the. entire bridge had to be re positioned 11 feet towards the north to accommodate certain FDOT. requirements Because the entire bridge was moved it did not impact the design efforts or the. construction schedule, FIU also retained BPA of Miami FL to perform Construction Engineering and Inspection CEI.
The construction was to proceed in eight stages See Figure 4 for the different stages of. construction reproduced from the construction document prepared by FIGG Essentially the. first stage was to cast the sub structure The second was to cast main span truss with all the post. tensioning of the deck canopy and diagonals completed in the casting yard The third was to. transport the main truss over the Self Propelled Modular Transporter SPMT and place the. main span over the south pier and north pylon The rest of the stages of construction consisted of. casting the intermediate section of pylon back span truss and the rest of the pylon and erecting. support pipes etc The incident occurred at the third stage The second stage provided the. advantage of ABC as the disruption to the traffic on SW 8th Street was reduced to a bare.


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