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242 BrookingsPapers Microeconomics1991, To be sure the two volumes are not equally weighty Volume 1. which is overwhelmingly theoretical as it contains surveys of the de. terminants of firm and market organization and the analysis of market. behavior is far larger in weight and girth than volume 2 which. surveys more applied issues and includes pieces on empirical methods. and results international issues and comparisons and government in. tervention in the marketplace The imbalance between theory and ap. plications is even greater than an eyeing or hefting of the volumes. reveals Although a few of the surveys in volume 1 discuss empirical. material the more applied volume contains a very heavy dose of theory. in the contributions of Ronald Braeutigam on Optimal Policies for. Natural Monopolies and David Baron on Design of Regulatory. Mechanisms and Institutions, The predominance of theory in these surveys accurately represents. the character of recent research in industrial organization It lends per. suasive support to the perennial plea of editors of journals concentrating. in the field for more good applied papers In their preface Schmalensee. and Willig mention four exciting trends in the field of industrial or. ganization that they believe make preparation and publication of the. Handbook particularly timely One among these is that new waves of. empirical and experimental work in industrial organization are gathering. momentum driven by clarified views of the limitations of the previous. focus on cross sectional interindustry studies and by the profusion of. new hypotheses and possibly testable conclusions produced by the ex. plosion of theoretical work 2 The relative attention that theory and. applications receive in the surveys accurately reflects that while em. pirical and experimental work may be gaining momentum they are not. yet fully up to the speed of theoretical developments I shall try later. in this review to suggest an explanation for this unbalanced growth. Given the division of labor between Franklin Fisher in his compan. ion essay in this issue and me my remarks here will focus on parts. 1 4 and 5 of the Handbook These parts survey material on the de. terminants of firm and market organization international issues and. comparisons and government intervention in the marketplace I shall. concentrate particularly on the first and the last of these three topics. and the connections between them,2 Schmalenseeand Willig 1989 vol 1 p xi. AlvinK Klevorick 243,Content and Style of the Handbook. The individual chapters are on the whole well written There are. however many more minor probably typographical errors than one. would ever want to have remain in such an important compendium. Misspellings inaccurate cross references to other chapters and gram. matical slips are numerous In some cases as when negations are in. correctly inserted or inadvertently omitted when on one occasion. several sentences are omitted or when important slips in equations. occur the errors significantly impede understanding One hopes that. the upcoming second printing will find them repaired. The various authors use different approaches to present their material. The variety enhances the readability of the volumes taken as a whole. and shows the effectiveness of alternative ways of interpreting the sur. veyor s task Some authors provide a systematic exposition of the ma. terial as John Panzar does in Technological Determinants of Firm. and Industry Structure This essay is particularly useful in distilling. the contributions of the important monograph Contestable Markets and. the Theory of Industry Structure coauthored by Baumol Panzar and. Willig Another skillful deployment of this most systematic approach. is David Baron s tour de force in expositing the literature on regulatory. mechanism design to which he has contributed so much. Some authors more self consciously take several steps back from the. material they are surveying This helps them to bring recent work into. perspective to draw together different models and to shape the central. issues currently addressed It also enables the authors to bring into. sharp focus the important questions for future research Bengt Holm. strom and Jean Tirole very effectively adopt this approach in their fine. contribution on the theory of the firm and its contractual basis. A third type of lens is used by Paul Joskow and Nancy Rose in their. essay on the effects of economic regulation Combining methodological. and substantive views of their subject Joskow and Rose begin with an. exposition of alternative frameworks and empirical methodologies for. assessing the effects of regulation They then survey the particular. effects of regulation on prices costs innovation product quality and. wealth distribution that researchers have uncovered by using these meth. Finally in the chapter on the determinants and effects of vertical. 244 BrookingsPapers Microeconomics1991, integration Martin Perry successfully draws together several important.
strands of literature He describes and assesses old and new theoretical. explanations of why firms at different stages of the production process. might integrate their operations But he also integrates an evaluation. of the empirical research that bears on the alternative explanations. Each chapter is written by a major player in the field which assures. that the reader is getting an expert s eyeview The various authors also. strive to provide a balanced view of the approaches to their subjects. Each writer tries to alert the reader to the problems as well as the. contributions of the theory or approach with which he or she is iden. tified Given the natural enthusiasm of a participant in a research pro. gram however a somewhat different structuremight have been valuable. One or another chapter might have been written by a knowledgeable. but more critical less sympathetic scholar Alternatively and probably. even better each chapter might have been accompanied by a critical. comment prepared not necessarily to critique the survey itself but to. provide a different evaluative viewpoint on the material covered in the. piece For example the reader might have come away from the Hand. book with a broader perspective if the volumes had contained a critical. assessment of the achievements of transaction cost economics by some. one who is less of an aficionado than Oliver Williamson who indeed. is its major prophet and a similar piece on the literature on regulatory. mechanism design by someone who is less enmeshed in the subject. than David Baron I choose these examples not because I am unenthu. siastic about the work surveyed by Baron and Williamson respectively. but on the contrary because I believe some contributions in these two. areas have been transformative, There are two notable gaps in the parts of the Handbook that I am. reviewing Indeed the footnotes in the preface suggest that Schmalen. see and Willig are as dismayed as this reader that one or another author. did not deliver the chapters which had been planned for inclusion that. would fill these holes, The first gap is the absence of a systematic treatment of empirical. work on the contractual nature of the firm Such a survey would have. naturally complemented the Holmstrom Tirole survey in the same way. as the Noll Joskow Rose and Gruenspecht Lave chapters on economic. regulation and health safety and environmental regulation complement. the more theoretical contributions of Braeutigam and Baron There is. Alvin K Klevorick 245, an empirical literature however slender on each of the four major. theoretical topics considered by Holmstrom and Tirole the boundaries. and character of firms their capital structures the role of management. and particularly the separation of ownership and control and the. internal hierarchical organization of the firm A chapter that told the. reader what we know empirically about the various theoretical models. that have been proffered on these issues would have been valuable For. example what effects of separation of ownership and control have been. identified How effective is the market for corporate control and par. ticularly the instruments of takeover and merger in generating efficient. managerial behavior What evidence is there that executive compen. sation schemes provide effective internal discipline mechanisms or even. that they succeed in closely linking pay and performance Do the ex. ecutive compensation schemes that firms adopt follow the lines that. agency theory suggests With regard to another of the issues that Holm. strom and Tirole treat in their chapter which of the several arguments. about determination of a firm s financing find support in empirical re. search Is the debt equity ratio chosen to provide optimal incentives to. management or is it selected to signal to market participants infor. mation that the firm management possesses or both How important. are the control rights rather than the residual return stream that a. voting share confers on its owner, In the course of their discussion of theoretical issues Holmstrom. and Tirole do provide a few brief references to related empirical work. Furthermore Panzar in his discussion of the econometrics of multi. product cost functions Williamson in his review of empirical studies. in transaction cost economics and Perry in his discussion of empirical. studies of vertical integration all provide some assessment of what we. know empirically about firm formation and organization But it would. have been useful to have these several strands and others for example. work on labor contracts capital structures and executive compensation. structures as they reflect the contractual basis of the firm drawn to. gether The chapter that Schmalensee and Willig intended to include. showing how theoretical and empirical tools from modern financial. economics have illuminated issues in industrial organization would have. helped here, The second major omission is the absence of a chapter providing an.
analysis of antitrust policies and their enforcement Several chapters. 246 Brookings Papers Microeconomics 1991, take up the slack as Perry and Williamson in part 1 and Ordover and. Saloner Varian and others in part 3 discuss various aspects of antitrust. policy But a more unified treatment of the theory and practice of. antitrust law and policy would have been valuable Such a chapter could. have examined the interplay between theory and policy in a number of. significant recent developments, One of these developments is the more sophisticated approach that. has been taken to market power its significance and its measurement. across the spectrum of antitrust law Another phenomenon of interest. is the changing role and content of per se rules against specific prac. tices price fixing for example and the corresponding expansion in. the breadth of application in substance if not in name of rule of reason. analyses The chapter on antitrustpolicy could have analyzed the changes. in merger law in the last decade and linked them to our new under. standing of firm behavior and organization Two other areas in which. recent developments in industrial organization could have been related. to antitrust policy are first our more sophisticated understanding of. vertical restraints and the law s more lenient treatment of them so long. as the prices are not involved and second the insights if any that. work in information economics and strategic behavior provide for the. assessment of information exchanges among firms and related facili. tating practices Finally such a chapter could have taken up issues of. antitrust enforcement and in particular questions about the role of. private litigation which a number of economists have studied in the. last decade or so, Just as there are gaps in coverage so there are overlaps as well But. these multiple coverings of the same ground are illuminating as when. Holmstrom and Tirole Williamson and Perry all treat the issue of. vertical integration indeed when they discuss the same work but. from somewhat different points of view 3 For Holmstrom and Tirole. it is essential that a theory of the firm be able to explain the occurrence. and extent of vertical integration if the theory is to address one of the. fundamental issues within its domain namely the scale and scope of. firms Williamson treats vertical integration as the paradigm problem. of transaction cost economics he believes that an understanding of. 3 Grossmanand Hart 1986 and Williamson 1971 1975 1985. AlvinK Klevorick 247, vertical integration illuminates much more general issues of complex. economic organization, While Holmstrom and Tirole and Williamson locate their analyses.
of vertical integration squarely within the incomplete contracting model. Perry surveys a broader range of explanations of vertical integration. in particular those in which market imperfections are featured All. three essays briefly mention technological economies that may give rise. to vertical integration The greater breadth of Perry s treatment is. appropriate of course because the subject of his chapter is precisely. defined as the determinants and effects of vertical integration. Similarly Noll Joskow and Rose and Gruenspecht and Lave all. discuss aspects of the interplay between politics and economics in reg. ulatory settings For Noll that interplay is the focal point of his inter. pretative survey on the politics of regulation The other two chapters. treat political economy issues within the context of the particular type. of regulation they are examining Joskow and Rose view the political. economy approach to regulation with its emphasis on the interaction. among interest groups for whom particular regulatory measures carry. different costs and benefits as a framework within which to assess the. effects of economic regulation They pay particular attention to what. research on the political economy of regulation has revealed about the. distributional effects of regulation and deregulation Gruenspecht and. Lave attend to the political origins of health safety and environmental. regulation They also describe how the political economy approach. illuminates the formulation of goals for agencies and the rents that such. social regulation generates, The various overlaps in coverage are useful because they provide. different perspectives on the same phenomenon or at least demonstrate. different contexts in which it is relevant But the overlaps are also. interesting because they identify several Schelling points as it were. of work on the theory of the firm and government regulation of the. marketplace,Trends that Motivated the Editors, One does not know of course whether the several trends that Schmal. ensee and Willig identify as coming together to make the Handbook s. 248 Brookings Papers Microeconomics 1991, appearance so timely were ones they sighted before or after they saw the. papers But all of these trends are salient in the three partsof the Handbook. I am reviewing here, I have already mentioned the gathering momentum of empirical and. experimental research to which the editors refer A second principal de. velopment they cite is the recent and ongoing revolution that is re. examining all microeconomic phenomena as strategic interactions with. explicitly specified and often asymmetric informationstructures which. they observe is particularly focused on industrial organization 4 The sur. veys of the determinants of firm and market structure and government. intervention in the marketplace make abundantlyclear the large formative. role the information economics revolution and especially analysis of the. effects of asymmetric information has played in deepening our under. standing of the economics of the firm and the economics of regulatory. interactions As Holmstrom and Tirole emphasize for example it was. the development of information economics in the 1970s that provided the. basis for the recent analysis of the organizational structureof firms which. has centered on an improved understanding of how one goes about. contracting when people know different pieces of information of relevance. for the organization as a whole 5, Similarly the centrality of informationeconomics and strategic analysis.
to the literature on the design of mechanisms to govern firm regulator. interactions is announced by Baron at the outset of his contribution The. focus of this chapter is the design of regulatory policies that take into. account the opportunities for strategic behavior provided by incomplete. and limited observability on the part of the regulator 6 Whether or not. adoption of the information economics perspective constitutes the replace. ment of one Kuhnian paradigm by another because of developments in. information economics we now view both firm organization and regulatory. interactions very differently than we did twenty years ago and there is. no turning back, The third trend to which the editors allude is the blurring of the tra. ditional boundaries between historically different fields of economics. They observe that the perfectly competitive model which had been central. 4 Schmalenseeand Willig 1989 vol 1 p xi,5 Schmalenseeand Willig 1989 vol 1 p 64. 6 Schmalenseeand Willig 1989 vol 2 p 1349,Alvin K Klevorick 249. to fields such as internationaltrade and macroeconomics is being replaced. by imperfect competition models drawn from industrialorganization This. development is certainly apparentin the literaturePaul Krugman surveys. under the heading of Industrial Organization and InternationalTrade. Models of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition as well as models of. duopoly in which firms deploy various tools of strategic behavior are. prominently featured in this literature and in Krugman s review. Finally Schmalensee and Willig observe that developments in the pol. icy arena have contributed to the excitement of industrial organization. A bevy of significant policy issues squarely in the domain of industrial. organization has been at the forefront of public and political attention in. recent years they write 7 Among the issues the editors mention are. takeover and merger activity the movement toward deregulation and the. increasing globalization of competition Not only do these issues draw. researchers directly into the policy arena but they also provide an im. portant impetus to theoretical and empirical research. The links between policy issues and research developments both the. oretical and empirical are apparent not only in the chapters directly fo. cused on the politics and economics of regulation but also in the more. theoretical contributions For example much of the work that Panzar. surveys on technological determinants of firm and market structure was. stimulated by antitrust and regulatory cases in the 1970s that involved. large multiproduct firms A good bit of the literature on the design of. regulatory policies and mechanisms which is reviewed in the Baron and. Braeutigam chapters had its origins in some of those same cases and. with respect to material Baron covers in concerns about controlling pol. lution by firms that have different production technologies and more in. formation about those technologies than the regulators possess Many. theoretical inquiries that introduced imperfect competition models in in. ternational trade of the type reviewed by Krugman were stimulated by. the increasing globalization of competition accompanying concerns about. the competitiveness of U S industry and complaints about the restrictive. trade practices of various countries The conceptual developments in the. theory of the firm and transaction cost economics in particular were. related to policy concerns about mergers takeovers and other corporate. restructurings The policy research agenda nexus would have been even. 7 Schmalenseeand Willig 1989 vol 1 p xii,250 BrookingsPapers Microeconomics1991. more clearly illuminated had the Handbook contained the missing chapters. on antitrustpolicy for example vis a vis mergers facilitating practices. and predation and financial economics contributions with regardto issues. such as mergers and takeovers and the market for managers. Inward to the New Frontier, Three other tendencies seem to me to mark recent developments in.
the literature surveyed in the substantive bookends parts 1 and 5 of. the two volumes of the Handbook First much recent research on the. theory of firm and market organization and on government intervention. in the marketplace has systematically unpacked the concepts we had. for the most part previously taken as primitive to our analysis Another. way to describe this development is to say that recent literature in. industrial organization has taken as a major concern the treatment of. microeconomic structures and relations as endogenous or at least as. more endogenous than they were treated before, The firm in today s industrial organization discourse is a much. richer concept than it was twenty five years ago And this is so even. though leading contributors to the literature such as Holmstrom and. Tirole characterize this field of inquiry as still young and immature 8. The firm is no longer a lifeless production or cost function with a. manager facing spot prices and mechanically selecting the profit. maximizing input output combination from the technologically feasible. set The relations among the firm s owner s its manager s its work. ers and its capital and materials suppliers are now to be understood as. the result of optimization decisions by agents making choices within. the technological and transactional environments including information. structure and human characteristics like bounded rationality and op. portunism they face, Similarly our understanding of regulatory constraint is much. deeper than it was This greater depth is an awareness not just of the. unintended as well as intended effects that imposing regulation can. have but of the complexity of what it means to impose a regulatory. constraint on a firm Regulatory policies are modeled not as simple. 8 Schmalenseeand Willig 1989 vol 1 p 64,AlvinK Klevorick 251. constraints imposed on a mechanically responsive firm but as endog. enous outcomes of the interactions among political constituencies leg. islators regulators and the regulated entities Again each player is. viewed as making its decision within a well specified technological and. strategic particularly information environment, To be sure these more profound understandings of basic concepts. in industrial organization and regulation did not spring full blown in. the last period of time Each set of developments had its precursors. For example Oliver Williamson s chapter on Transaction Cost Eco. nomics traces the origins of that literature s contribution to our. understandingof firm formation to the work of Coase Commons Barnard. and Llewellyn in the 1930s Roger Noll in his chapter on Economic. Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation also cites though briefly the. precursorsof George Stigler s seminal 1971 article The Theory of Eco. nomic Regulation Arguably however it was Stigler s contribution that. startedthe surge in literatureon the political economy of regulatorypolicy 9. Overall this emphasis on examining and understanding entities and. relations that we had taken as given the firm the regulatoryconstraint. pervades the recent literatureon which the Handbook contributorsfocus. The mission of the industrial organization literatureremains to understand. the behavior of a particular set of economic agents and the implications. that behavior has for market structures and processes economic perfor. mance and public policies toward the marketplace But we now develop. explanations and predictions of those agents behavior starting from a. more microanalytic level than we had before,The InterdisciplinaryReach of Recent Research.
A second characteristic of recent research on the theory of the firm. and government intervention in the marketplace is its interdisciplinary. character The work of Williamson and others on transaction cost eco. nomics explicitly combines the insights of legal scholarship and or. ganization theory with those of economics to explain the origins and. functioning of firms and other economic institutions Strong links be. tween economics and accounting have also been forged as theories of. 9 Stigler 1971,252 BrookingsPapers Microeconomics1991. firm structureand hierarchieshave focused on incentive mechanisms. and monitoringin principal agentrelations The confluenceof the con. cerns of designers of modernaccountingsystems and those who seek. to explain incentive structuresin firms is apparentin the Holmstrom. and Tirole chapteron the theory of the firm, Despite the importanceof concepts such as boundedrationalityand. opportunismin these moderntheories of the firm the Handbook chap. ters on this subjectcontain virtuallyno citationsto the recent literature. on individual psychology Several pieces do cite HerbertA Simon s. seminal work Models of Man publishedin 1957 for its discussion of. boundedrationalityand its implications Insofaras the theories of the. firmaim to explain the structureand governancerules of organizations. when individualagents are less thanthe omniscient fully rationalchar. acters of more traditionalmodels it would seem that the insights psy. chologists have to offer into humanbehavior particularlywith regard. to gatheringand processing informationand actingupon thatdatabase. would be pertinent 10, Some researchof cognitive psychologists is noted by Gruenspecht. and Lave in their discussions of risk assessmentand the setting of risk. reductiongoals Furthermore in recent work Roger Noll and James. Krierhave broughtsome of the learningof cognitive psychologists to. bear on the demand for and supply of regulationof risk 11But there. seems to be much more scope for infusion of ideas from these psy. chologists in industrialorganizationand especially in new theories of. the firm Forexample conventionalexpected utilitymaximizersremain. the central actors in many formal models in the modern contractual. theoryof the firm Some cognitive psychologistshave found however. that people systematically departfrom the conventional mode of de. cision analysis when they make choices underrisk and that some com. monkindsof mistakesoccurin the assessmentof therelevantprobabilities. What are the implications of these findingsfor the formal contractual. models and the theories that build upon them Can the observed de. parturesfrom conventionalanalysis be incorporatedto yield new pre. dictions about firm structure, As the Noll Joskow Rose and Gruenspecht Lavechaptersall make. 10 See for exampleKahneman Slovic andTversky 1982,11 Noll and Krier 1990.
AlvinK Klevorick 253, clear work on economic regulationhas increasinglyjoined with work. in political science and law in trying to understandbetter the origins. as well as the effects of regulatorypolicy The effort has been aimed. at developing a sound microeconomicallybased theoryof the political. behaviorthat leads to the creation and directionof regulatoryinstitu. tions This is neitheran intellectuallyimperialisticattemptto take over. the political scientists and legal scholars understandingof regulation. andits origins nor a desertionof the field of concernswith the economic. effects of regulation, The intensifiedinteractionwith political science and law is instead. a naturalconsequence of the broadening in the last twenty five years. or so of the issues that are understoodto lie within the domain of the. economics of regulation As more effort has been devoted to asking. why a particularset of regulations has been put in place and those. regulationsare administeredthe way they are the desirabilityof draw. ing uponpolitical scientists theoriesof interest grouppolitics andlegal. scholars understandingof the administrativeprocessis apparent The. details of political and economic institutionsand how they affect both. distributionaland efficiency consequencesof policies have become a. centralissue in moderntheories of regulation 12, As the evaluative reviews by Noll and by Joskow and Rose make. clear these inquiries into the political economy of regulationare still. at an early stage and the theory in this area leads by a considerable. marginour accumulatedquantitativeresults Furthermore as Joskow. and Rose emphasize at the end of their chapter The work on the. political economy of regulationmust inevitablybe carefully relatedto. the effects of economic regulationand the way economic regulationis. accomplished The politics and economic consequences of regulation. are intertwinedin complex ways 13, The Role of Law in Theories of the Firm and Regulation. Reading parts 1 and 5 of the Handbook together suggests a third. additionaltheme albeit one less explicit than any of the others I have. 12 Schmalenseeand Willig 1989 vol 2 p 1262,13 Schmalenseeand Willig 1989 vol 2 p 1498.
254 BrookingsPapers Microeconomics1991, discussed It is the convergence of the literaturesof the theory of the. firm and governmentinterventionin the marketplace, One might begin by noting the commonalityof the referencesin part. l s chapterson the theory of the firm and the works cited in the more. theoreticalchapterson regulatoryinstitutions In partthatcommonality. reflectsthe fact thatboth topics fall withinthe field of microeconomics. Hence both have been dramaticallyaffectedby the recentinformation. economics and strategic interactionrevolutionthat is still going on in. the study of microeconomicphenomena But the set of specific refer. ences that the recent literatureon the theoryof the firmshareswith the. work on governmentinterventionis broader For example the same. multiproductcost functionconcepts thatJohnPanzarpresentsand then. applies to the determinationof firm and industrystructureare central. to Ronald Braeutigam spresentationof the analysis of Optimal Pol. icies for NaturalMonopolies,The Theory of the Firm and the Legal Structure. More fundamentally however the two literaturesare converging. becausethe ideas thathave becomecentralto the literatureon the theory. of the firm implicate a legal and regulatoryframework A defining. characteristicof the recent researchon why firms exist and how they. are structuredis its emphasis on incomplete contractsand in one ap. proach propertyrights The concept of what is contractibleis central. to recentanalysesof the choice betweenrelyingon arrangementswithin. a firmversusdependinguponmarkettransactions An attractivefeature. of MartinPerry s chapteron the determinantsand effects of vertical. integrationis his effort to relate the concept of incomplete contracts. invoked in the literatureon the theoryof the firmto featuresof contract. law to wit treatmentby the UniformCommercialCode and the courts. of conditions precedent and indefinite contracts A paper by Alan. Schwartz Legal ContractTheories and IncompleteContracts ex. ploresin greaterdepththe connectionsbetweenthe incompletecontracts. of theorists models andthe doctrinesof contractlaw as the courtsapply. Furthermore discussions of hierarchicalrelationswithin firmsnec. 14 Schwartz 1990,Alvin K Klevorick 255, essarily drawupon ideas aboutauthorityandrely on assumptionsabout. which actions by occupantsof differentlevels of the hierarchywill and. will not be enforced Holmstromand Tirole include in their survey a. brief discussion of the role of authority particularlyits delegation in. the internalhierarchyof the firm Previewingthe subsection they cau. tion the reader though that theirdiscussion makes little referenceto. models for the simple reason that there is almost no formal work on. the topic and that their remarkson it are intended to bring attention. to a big gap in formal theorizing about the firm In the discussion. itself Holmstrom and Tirole remark that authority its scope and. entitlements is a ratherelusive concept 15, Incompletecontracts authorityrelations and relatedconcepts and.
the approachesthat build upon them presupposea legal structureor a. set of social normsthatestablisheswhatrightsindividuals andgroups. have and how those rights will be enforced Although recognition of. legal constraintshas always been an essential partof the economics of. regulation the central role of legal rules in the theory of the firm is. new a far cry from the features on which the standard textbook. neoclassical theory of the firm focused, To see how importanta legal structureis to the new economic theory. of the firm consider the two majornecessary conditions for contract. ibility of a transaction observability and verifiability Each of these. requirementsentails the physical capacityto undertakea particularact. As to observability a partymust be able to determine by some sensory. mode whethera particularevent has occurred with regardto verifia. bility one or anotherpartymust be able to display to a thirdpartywhat. has transpiredandthatoutsiderto the transactionmustbe able to discern. thatreality There are not only physical requirementsfor each of these. preconditionsto contractibility but resource requirementsas well It. takes resources at least some time and effort to observe an action. and it surely requiresresources for parties to a transactionto provide. the necessary data to a third party and for that third party to reach a. judgmentabout what has in fact occurred, Observabilityand verifiabilityalso take as given certainfeaturesof. a legal system That is transparentin the case of verifiability A third. party whethera courtor anotherdispute resolvinginstitution must be.

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