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Deliverable D 2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and
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D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. Executive summary, This first draft of the Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements deliverable mainly addresses the first. two aspects by proposing a risk assessment and mitigation approach for the selected 5G ENSURE security. use cases This document is not investigating in this first version the intrinsic risks of new 5G infrastructure. and network which is not yet fully defined Those investigations will be delivered in subsequent iterations. of this document in particular to address such security issues as those related to the 5G network segments. and trust boundaries 5G slicing concept RAN and core level and interaction between slices and issues. related to the level of isolation and associated proofs needed along with efficient remediation capabilities. This document takes the first steps towards the definition of a risk assessment and mitigation methodology. to be followed for the specific task of evaluating the 5G security uses cases and architecture Firstly we. discuss and define terminology This is essential as common speech terminology can be quite inexact but in. risk management we must be precise We then review the state of the art in risk assessment and. mitigation understanding what existing methodology or combination of suits the evaluation of. 5G ENSURE proposed use cases, To understand 5G networks we must first understand the proposed architectural framework and its. differences when compared to the previous 4G networks We therefore introduce the conceptual 5G. security framework proposed until the present moment within the 5G ENSURE project work ongoing. The Risk Management Context is then defined looking first at the 5G assets and actors which is followed. by the identification of threats The 5G ENSURE risk evaluation methodology for use case analysis is also. introduced with some possible approaches to risk likelihood estimation Nevertheless the methodology. will be refined in the final version of this document M24 after examination of each of the approaches. especially for factors such as risk severity impact and the level of control of remediation. The core chapter provides an initial threat analysis of representative use cases defined by the 5G ENSURE. project after the threat description formalism template is introduced As agreed by the 5G ENSURE. partners the focus is made on the internal threats in this draft document i e those derived from 5G. ENSURE specific use cases are only analyzed in this first version as they capture the very essence of. security and privacy aspects of 5G networks as seen by the project. The chapter 6 gives some initial design recommendations with respect to the analyzed 5G threats. As this document is a draft risk assessment methodology the next steps to be done are set out alongside. the conclusions chapter In particular the final version of the deliverable D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation. and Requirements will comprise the following parts full threat analysis including external threats coming. from other sources than 5G ENSURE use cases their categorization prioritization with regard to severity. and impact complete mitigation and remediation recommendations functional requirements and. architectural options towards T2 4 definition of relevant metrics for use of security monitoring as well as. penetration tests over the security testbed and gap analysis related to WP4. 671562 5G ENSURE 2, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. 5G ENSURE belongs to the first group of EU funded projects which collaboratively develop 5G under the. umbrella of the 5G Infrastructure Public Private Partnership 5G PPP in the Horizon 2020 Programme The. overall goal of 5G ENSURE is to deliver strategic impact across technology and business enablement. standardisation and vision for a secure resilient and viable 5G network The project covers research. innovation from technical solutions 5G security architecture and testbed with 5G security enablers to. market validation and stakeholders engagement spanning various application domains. The document has been written in cooperation with the D2 2 Trust model draft contributors as for the. common terminology and a sub set of most important use cases covered This draft version it is primarily. nourished by D2 1 Use cases deliverable for the derivation of major 5G threats as seen by the consortium. and along with the trust model feeds into the work on architecture currently under investigation and to be. reported in D2 4 Of course the risk assessment mitigation and especially requirements also contribute to. the work underway in WP3 in all tasks for security enabler definitions. Disclaimer, The information in this document is provided as is and no guarantee or warranty is given that the. information is fit for any particular purpose, The EC flag in this deliverable is owned by the European Commission and the 5G PPP logo is owned by the.
5G PPP initiative The use of the flag and the 5G PPP logo reflects that 5G ENSURE receives funding from. the European Commission integrated in its 5G PPP initiative Apart from this the European Commission or. the 5G PPP initiative have no responsibility for the content. Copyright notice,2015 2017 5G ENSURE Consortium,671562 5G ENSURE 3. D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. Deliverable D2 3 1,Executive summary 2,Foreword 3,Disclaimer 3. Copyright notice 3,Contents 4,1 Introduction 6,2 Terminology 6. 3 Methodology related work 7, 4 Risk Management Context Threats in 5G ENSURE Use Cases 10. 4 1 The reference 5G security framework 11,4 2 Risk Identification 14.
4 2 1 5G ENSURE Assets Identification 14, 4 2 2 5G ENSURE Threat Identification and categorization 19. 4 3 5G ENSURE Risk Evaluation methodology 25, 5 Internal threat description analysis from Use Cases 26. 5 1 Threat descriptions Use Cases cluster 1 Identity Management 27. 5 2 Threat descriptions Use Cases cluster 2 Enhanced Identity Protection and Authentication 34. 5 3 Threat descriptions Use Cases cluster 3 IoT Device Authentication and Key Management 39. 5 4 Threat descriptions Use Cases cluster 4 Authorization of Device to Device Interactions 44. 5 5 Threat descriptions Use Cases cluster 5 Software Defined Networks Virtualization and. Monitoring 45, 5 6 Threat descriptions Use Cases cluster 6 Radio Interface Protection 62. 5 7 Threat descriptions Use Cases cluster 7 Mobility Management Protection 64. 5 8 Threat descriptions Use Cases cluster 8 Ultra Reliable and Standalone Operations 66. 5 9 Threat descriptions in Use Cases of Cluster 9 Trusted Core Network and Interconnect 68. 5 10 Threat descriptions in Use Cases of Cluster 10 5G Enhanced Security Services 78. 5 11 Threat descriptions in Use Cases of Cluster 11 Lawful Interception 82. 6 Analysis Functional design recommendations 85,7 Conclusions and Next Steps 86. 8 References 87,9 Appendix 1 Use cases threats Identification 88.
10 Appendix 2 Abbreviations 89,671562 5G ENSURE 4, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. 671562 5G ENSURE 5, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. 1 Introduction, 5G network architecture is significantly different from the architectures of any previous generation. network where new network technologies are proposed both for the access and core network. infrastructures new actors stakeholders arise and novel business models are made possible The attack. surface is bigger because of massive number of connected devices the virtualization techniques to be used. in 5G the support for open networks etc We foresee that 5G systems design and deployment will raise. numerous security challenges and resulting risks like. related to network virtualization specific mobile and multi tenant VNFs sensitive data isolation etc. risks induced by wireless network topology multi RAN HetNets multi hop D2D unlicensed spectrum. as alternative access, new services plain old communication services utilities mission critical applications. M2M IOT sensors V2X will co exist and thus will necessitate devising particular end to end 5G. security architecture allying optimization and complexity of the system. Therefore the Risk assessment for 5G must be carefully studied and defined by examining the current. methodologies and coming with a comprehensive model that will best adapt to the new network. architecture stakeholders and business models Our approach is to perform a risk assessment and. mitigation evaluation related to multi stakeholder 5G system and NFV comprising new risks and modifying. existing ones Those studies will be finalized in the second version of this document M24. 2 Terminology, Risk assessment and mitigation is of interest in many different research IT disciplines but also in military.
and civil industry economics etc To avoid the problems of jargonised terminology we propose to follow. a common definition alongside the whole 5G ENSURE project therefore a terminology which is also shared. with the project s deliverable D2 2 Trust model draft 2. Risk exposure of someone or something valued to danger harm or loss. In classical risk analysis including information system risk management based on ISO 27001 a risk exists. where there are potential threats i e a threat is a source of risk Here we need to move away from the. strict English definition which encompasses the notion that a threat is a statement of intent to cause harm. or loss In the context of 5G ENSURE it does not matter whether or not intent to cause harm exists or is. communicated The definitions from RFC 4949 are actually more useful. Threat a potential for violation of security which exists when there is an entity circumstance capability. action or event that could cause harm, RFC 4949 makes it clear that threats could be intentional involving attack by a malicious and intelligent. entity or accidental arising from an unintended error or natural disaster It goes on to define further. terms describing the structure of a threat, Threat action a realization of a threat i e an occurrence in which system security is assaulted as the. result of either an accidental event or an intentional act. Threat consequence a security violation that results from a threat action. 671562 5G ENSURE 6, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. Threat agent a system entity that performs a threat action or an event that results in a threat action. Finally we can add two more definitions that are important in risk analysis. Threat likelihood the probability that a threat is realised i e that the threat action will occur. Threat impact the level of harm caused by the threat consequence. In conventional risk analysis based on ISO 27005 or more generally ISO 31010 the level of risk is. determined from a combination of threat likelihood and impact The correct treatment depends on the. level of risk the main options being to,accept the risk i e trust that it won t arise. avoid the risk by disengaging with the untrusted entity. transfer the risk e g by insuring against the risk or reaching an agreement with someone else. making them responsible or, reduce the risk by using security measures to reduce the threat likelihood or to mitigate its.
consequences,3 Methodology related work, There are a number of documents from different standardization bodies addressing the issues of threat and. risk assessment and mitigation in computer or telecommunication networks In this document we. provide a brief description of the standard well consolidated methodologies which have been taken into. account by the 5G ENSURE project, ITU T Recommendation X 805 Security architecture for systems providing end to end communications 3. has been developed by ITU T SG 17 ITU T Lead Study Group on Telecommunication Security and was. published in October 2003 This architecture provides a structured framework that forces the consideration. of all possible threats and attacks to provide comprehensive end to end network security It is based on the. concepts of, Security Layers Infrastructure Security Layer Services Security Layer Applications Security Layer. they represent a hierarchical approach to securing a network Each Security Layer has unique. vulnerabilities and specific threats For this reason each of these layers must be addressed when. creating an end to end security solution because at each point the network may be exposed to a. new risk threat or attack, Security Planes End User Security Plane Management Security Plane Control Signaling Security. Plane they represent the types of activities that occur on a network Different security. vulnerabilities may exist in each of these planes and each plane along with the three layers must be. secured in order to provide an effective security plan. Security dimensions access control authentication Non Repudiation Data Confidentiality. Communication Security data integrity availability privacy they represent the classes of actions. that can be taken or technologies that can be deployed in order to counteract threats or potential. attacks present at each security layer and plane,671562 5G ENSURE 7.
D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. The ITU TT X 805 Security Architecture is illustrated in the following figure Figure 1 In the ITU X 805. standard the definition of threats makes reference to another document X 801 4 which in turn does. not contain any further useful threat description at least as far as telecommunication networks are. Figure 1 ITU TT X 805 Security Architecture for Systems Providing End to End. End Communications, A further document NIST SP800 30 Risk Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems Systems. delivered by NIST National,National Institute of Standards and Technology. Technology 5 presents a guide for risk assessment, evaluation and mitigation more specifically related to IT systems networks included The risk assessment. process in SP 800 30, 30 takes inputs from a preparatory step that establishes the context scope assumptions. and key information sources for the process and then uses identif identified. ied threats and vulnerabilities,vulnerabilitie to, determine their likelihood impact on assets and risk Figure 2 gives an overview of the key steps required in.
order to complete a comprehensive risk assessment program as outlined in NIST SP 800 800 3. 671562 5G ENSURE 8, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. Figure 2 NIST SP800 30 is Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems. Yet another standard the ISO IEC 27005 2011 Information technology Security techniques Information. security risk management 6 contains the description of the information security risk management. process and its activities which include context establishment risk assessment risk treatment risk. acceptance risk communication and risk monitoring and review. The context establishment consists of, Setting the basic criteria such as the risk management approach the risk evaluation criteria the. impact criteria and the risk acceptance criteria, Defining the scope and boundaries of the risk management. Defining the organisation and the responsibilities for information security risk management. The risk assessment consists of, Identifying the risk by considering the assets within the defined scope the threats the. vulnerabilities that can be abused by threats having a negative impact on the assets. Estimating the risk by selecting the risk analysis methodology which can be qualitative. quantitative or mixture of both by defining the likelihood and determining the risk level for all. relevant incident scenarios, Evaluating the risk evaluation by comparing the level of risk against the risk evaluation criteria and.
the risk acceptance criteria defined in the context establishment. The risk treatment consists of, Selecting four different options risk removing retention avoidance sharing by considering the. outcome of the risk assessment the expected cost for implementing these options and the. expected benefits from these options, The purpose of ISO 27005 is to provide guidelines for information security risk management It does not. specify recommend or even name any specific risk analysis method although it does specify a structured. systematic and rigorous process from analysing risks to creating the risk treatment plan For this reason the. terminology and concepts used in ISO 27005 are widely accepted. 671562 5G ENSURE 9, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. Figure 3 ISO IEC 27005 2011 Information security risk management process. As a final remark on the methodologies we want to outline that we have also considered the literature. addressing the limits of the traditional well consolidated risk assessment methodologies we have. considered herein 7 It turns out that the traditional approaches where assets are persistent items or. properties of value and have owners would work at their best in situations where the evaluated IT systems. run in closed environment within an organization and therefore have unique owners which is not always. the case for 5G systems For example all roaming scenarios and VMNOs which do not actually own the. equipment even though we can subdivide assets into the service of the operator and the actual. hardware of the infrastructure owner Nonetheless 5G ENSURE adopts a traditional approach as the. alternatives would require a larger consensus For simplification the proposed methodology application will. have to be reiterated for each security layer and by each asset owner at the infrastructure layer The. higher services and application layers will have to take into consideration an inherent risk posed by. threats attacks at the infrastructure layer, 4 Risk Management Context Threats in 5G ENSURE Use Cases. The methodology which will be used within the 5G ENSURE project for the risk assessment is based on the. Risk Management Process ISO 27005 and especially on its simplification represented by NIST SP 800 30. We have based the process on this standard mainly for its wide spread acceptance and usage in the IT. industry and because it provides a complete well defined and consistent terminology and methodology for. risk management,671562 5G ENSURE 10, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft.
Figure 4 Complete Risk Assessment Procedure, According to the ISO 27005 standard the Risk assessment process has 3 main parts which will be detailed. in the rest of the document,Risk identification,Risk analysis. Risk evaluation, Before going further a reference 5G security architecture will be illustrated even if we must keep in mind. that this is ongoing work within 5G ENSURE,ENSURE and could change during the project s life. 4 1 The reference 5G security,rity framework,The reference 5G security architectural framework.
framework where these risk assessment processes will be applied. is still under definition within the project, project s task 2 4 Nevertheless we can already consider herein. here a first, high level architectural considerations proposed by the 5G ENSURE project for 5G. In particular the concept of domain in 5G network and system has to be defined A domain is traditionally. 3G and 4G networks the highest level, level group of physical entities Reference points are de. defined between,671562 5G ENSURE 11, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. Figure 5 Domains defined in TS 23 101, This 4G domain structure may remain valid in 5G with the following considerations requiring adaptations.
and associated risk impact, in 5G we may have 3rd party ID providers that may affect the home network domain. in 5G in the User Equipment domain we may have direct connections between UEs. in 5G we may have several Infrastructure domains from. different providers owners such as access core,access core transit network or cloud. loud infrastructure providers,User Equipment and Infrastructure doma. domain will remain as physical grouping, the USIM Mobile Equipment Access Network and Core Network domains may to some degree. remain as physical entities and will certainly remain valid as trust domains. The main concept not illustrated in the current domain. domain ss definition is the slicing concept introduced in 5G. A draft security domains proposal for 5G which considers subdivision of domains and slicing is presented in. Figure 6 acronyms SN Serving Network AN Access network IM Identity Management ID. Infrastructure providers e g ID2 could be Amazon EC2. EC2 Rn Resource 1 2 n etc, Specifically we use the following draft definition of 5G domain.
A grouping of network entities according to physical or logical aspects relevant for 5G networks. Physical grouping is similar to 23 101 Logical groupings can be according to similarity in functionality e g. RAN vs CN or administrative ownership related e g home vs serving operator vs 3rd party vertical. or infrastructure provider vs tenant, We propose to also add the concept of compound domains Slices as special services offered to 5G users. seem to be an example of this since they m, may be transversal e2e to other domains Slicing is indeed a. major concern on which strong security risk analysis has to be done. 671562 5G ENSURE 12, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. Figure 6 5G ENSURE Security domains proposal, The functionality and communication protocols u used in this domains structure maps to the. functional logical strata shown in Figure 7 A stratum in 23 101 parlance is defined as Grouping of. protocols data and functions related to one aspect of the services provided by one or or several domains. e g home stratum contains the protocols and functions related to the handling and storage of subscription. data functions related to subscription data management customer care including billing and charging. mobility management and authentication,uthentication are located in this stratum.
Figure 7 Strata, The application home serving and transport strata have been already identified within UMTS and remain. the same in 5G while the management stratum was not included before Management stratum contains. the protocols and functions related to network configuration thishis includes the functions of creating and. deleting virtualized networks and network slices It also contains SDN specific protocols like OpenFlow and. northboundnd APIs for network applications Furthermore network monitoring functionalities are also. contained in the management stratum Several issues are still to be addressed e g if there is a need for a. 671562 5G ENSURE 13, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. sub stratum for security management or for monitoring for detecting security anomalies intrusion. detection lawful interception in a dynamic 5G network How to reflect multi party trust issues These are. being discussed in ongoing D2 4 5G ENSURE security architecture work. For risk assessment purposes we note that these logical architectural views present a one to one mapping. to the security planes defined in ITU T X 805 which makes us more confident that the right approach is. being followed in the initial steps of context establishment. Further investigation of risk analysis with regard to 5G security architecture will be delivered for the next. version of the present document,4 2 Risk Identification. The purpose of risk identification is to determine what factors can cause a potential loss damage and. where and how it might happen ISO 2011 In order to manage the risks it is necessary to identify the. assets consider the threats that could compromise those assets and estimate the damage that the. realization of any threat could pose to them,4 2 1 5G ENSURE Assets Identification. The first step is the identification of all the assets within the 5G scope that need to be protected with. special attention to those that are considered most critical because they cause most damage if. compromised, As a first step towards the assets identification we looked at the available taxonomies and we found a very.
simplified but still useful one from ENISA 12 where the main assets of a mobile network are grouped into. the following 7 categories,Data Plane Assets,o Network Elements. o Communication medium,Control Plane Assets,o Software. o Hardware,Application Plane Assets,o Software,o Hardware. Service provider IT Infrastructure,o IT Infrastructure. o Billing systems,o Operator data,o End user data,Network service provider physical infrastructure.
o Facilities,o Energy Power,671562 5G ENSURE 14, D2 3 Risk Assessment Mitigation and Requirements draft. o End user data,o SLAs and regulations,Human agents. o SDN Administrators,o SDN Application Developers,o Network Service Operators. o End User Application Developers,o End User Application Administrators. o End User Service Providers,o End Users, The approach adopted within the 5G ENSURE project was to start with this high level set of assets and try.
to come with more specific assets by focusing on a generic 5G mobile network vision This list has been. extended to contain the assets related to SDN and NFV technologies since they will be largely used to. implement the 5G mobile network, In the rest of this section we provide an enriched 5G assets list with a focus on mobile network vision. Though we also propose a list of assets related to SDN and NFV technologies which can be used to. implement the 5G mobile network, We distinguish three types of assets Primary assets which are functions and components related to a. mobile network Secondary assets which are associated to the technologies used to implement the. mobile network i e SDN and NFV technologies and actors which are users and organizations. participating to the 5G security use cases mainly described in D2 1. Note that in the threat description tables from Chapter 5 we will indicate the ENISA high level asset. categories in order to keep the tables simple and legible More detailed 5G ENSURE asset specification can. be provided by each use case by filling in the appropriate field in the Other category. 4 2 1 1 Primary assets,We consider the following primary assets 9 10. Components these are physical machines and servers used to provide mobile network functions. o User equipment, Secure Element This is a tamper resistant platform e g certified at EAL4. Mobile Equipment,o Access Network, Base Station This is the antenna and hardware running functions related to radio.
transmission and reception such as Radio resources management Mobility. management and Security i e confidentiality and integrity protection. o Core Network This includes hardware servers used to run core network functions home. or serving, o Radio Resources Management allocation and maintenance of radio resources. o Mobility Management handover and inter working management. o Session Management,o Accounting and Charging,671562 5G ENSURE 15.

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