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16 10 ARCENT Transition to Combined Joint Task Force
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ARCENT Transition to,Combined Joint Task Force,Operation Inherent Resolve. Initial Impressions Report,DIGITAL VERSION AVAILABLE. A digital version of this CALL publication is available to view download or. reproduce from the CALL website http call army mil Reproduction of. this publication is welcomed and highly encouraged. ARCENT TRANSITION TO CJTF OIR IIR, At the request of the United States Army Central Command ARCENT. Commanding General the Center for Army Lessons Learned CALL. organized and conducted a collection with key members of the ARCENT. Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve CJTF OIR staff. The ARCENT Commander approved the following areas of focus for the. collection, Joint manning document gaps permissions and authorities of the joint. task force, Joint interagency intergovernmental and multinational.
interoperability,Coalition and host nation partnerships. The CALL team consisting of 14 subject matter experts and military. analysts conducted the collection from 20 through 22 OCT 2015 The team. interviewed 29 members of the ARCENT headquarters and took part in. the transition of an Army Service component command to a combined joint. forces land component command which then became the core of CJTF. OIR CALL conducted an in brief with the ARCENT staff on 20 OCT 2015. and an out brief with the ARCENT commander and staff on 22 OCT 2015. CALL produced this IIR based on the insights and perspectives gained from. the analysis of the interviews conducted at the ARCENT headquarters. ARCENT TRANSITION TO CJTF OIR IIR,ARCENT Transition to Combined Joint Task Force. Operation Inherent Resolve Initial Impressions Report. Table of Contents,Executive Summary 1,Topic 1 Joint Manning Document 5. Topic 2 Permissions and Authorities 9,Topic 3 Joint Intergovernmental Interagency and. Multinational Interoperability,Topic 4 Coalition and Host Nation Partnerships 17.
Topic 5 Mission Command 25,Topic 6 Public Affairs Office 33. Center For Army Lessons Learned,CALL Director COL Paul P Reese. Team Leads LTC David L Benton,Milton M Hileman,Analysts Neil Buthorne. Philip Wojtalewicz,Craig Hayes, The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this. periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required. by law of the Department, Unless otherwise stated whenever the masculine or feminine gender is.
used both are intended, Note Any publications other than CALL publications referenced in. this product such as ARs ADPs ADRPs ATPs FMs and TMs must be. obtained through your pinpoint distribution system. ARCENT TRANSITION TO CJTF OIR IIR,Executive Summary. Background, In June 2014 the situation in Iraq reached a level of crisis and the United. States Central Command USCENTCOM was directed to commence. military operations against Daesh also known as the Islamic State of Iraq. and the Levant or ISIL The USCENTCOM commander designated the. Army component the United States Army Central Command ARCENT. as a joint force land component command JFLCC for operations in Iraq. The availability of forces already in theater under ARCENT s regional. security plan enabled the JFLCC to have rapid access to Iraq with the. appropriate mission command security and sustainment capabilities for. initial assessments and it had the ability to provide initial assistance to. Iraqi Security Forces The JFLCC also had reachback capability within easy. access in the area of responsibility that included long range fires and myriad. sustainment functions, Allies and partner nations began to express their desires to contribute. capabilities and in mid September the JFLCC was designated as the. Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command Iraq CJFLCC I The. challenges now included not only integrating coalition capabilities but. establishing the mission command system networks to support coalition. operations, Recognizing that operations against Daesh required full joint integration.
USCENTCOM designated CJFLCC I as Combined Joint Task Force. Operation Inherent Resolve CJTF OIR eventually becoming a combined. joint task force CJTF in mid October The joint manning document. JMD was created to sustain a CJTF while continuing theater army. responsibilities for a command that was also designated as a combined. joint forces land component command CJFLCC by USCENTCOM for. operations in the joint operations area The time frame from submission of. the JMD until boots on the ground was anticipated at 120 days from the. Secretary of Defense s approval To mitigate this gap ARCENT was able. to work with joint Service component commands in theater another. ARCENT standing relationship that proved vital to assist with joint fills. until the respective Service headquarters could assess their requirements. ARCENT was further able to request augmentation from the Joint Enabling. Capabilities Command and joint intelligence support element both of. which provided significant assistance with joint functions and capabilities. CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, ARCENT transitioned its CJTF responsibilities to a U S Army Corps. headquarters in September which served a dual role as the ARFOR for the. theater and a CJTF headquarters, From the start of USCENTCOM s operations against Daesh to the. deployment of U S Army III Corps as the CJTF 15 months had passed In. this time ARCENT was designated as a CJFLCC and then later also served. as the ARFOR and ultimately CJTF OIR, Since 2001 ARCENT has transitioned to a CJTF three times and four. times since 1991 The assignment of an Army Service component command. ASCC as a JFLCC or a JTF will happen again Therefore ARCENT. wanted to tell the Army its experiences in order to find a more effective. transition if required in the future, Late September 2015 ARCENT contacted the Mission Command Center of. Excellence with a request for a Center for Army Lessons Learned CALL. collection team to document the ARCENT headquarters experience. transitioning from an ASCC to a CJFLCC to a CJTF, CALL recruited organized and trained a collection and analysis team from.
the Combined Arms Center and the joint community The team deployed. to ARCENT headquarters Shaw Air Force Base SC in October 2015 to. conduct key leader interviews The team consisted of members from the. following organizations,Center for Army Lessons Learned CALL. Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate CADD,Directorate of Training and Strategy DOTS. United States Army Information Operations Proponent USAIPO. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance JCISFA. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Directorate JCOA. United States Air Force Air Combat Command,United States Air Force Lemay Center. Key Lessons and Insights, Building an ad hoc JMD for an ASCC is not easy because it requires. field grades with specific skill sets not usually found within the. ASCC headquarters This is particularly true when the requirements. trend toward the need for skills and personnel inherent in a tactical. headquarters,ARCENT TRANSITION TO CJTF OIR IIR, When planning for and developing the JMD ASCCs must carefully.
consider the impact of the force management level FML Consider. assigning dual roles and responsibilities to positions where practical. when the FML restricts the number of personnel permitted in the. headquarters Be prepared for some members of the headquarters to. have a dual hatted role for example ASCC ARFOR CJFLCC or. The Joint Staff should develop off the shelf JMD packages including. certification requirements to key billets such as targeting intelligence. cyber and information operations military occupational specialties as. a ready starting point for building a contingency headquarters JMD. Build mission packages for small medium and large command posts. that balance austerity with the potential length of the mission. Consider the critical lines of effort LOEs when building the JMD. and headquarters Prioritize LOEs weight the main LOE for resources. then resource the remaining LOEs, ASCCs must train for the rapid deployment of their contingency. command post as a CJFLCC or CJTF Having a forward presence. facilitates the situational awareness and deployment of the JTF into the. area of operations and strengthens relations with the host nation. The planning effort must include a thorough review of orders and tasks. assigned in order to identify and understand all the authorities and. funding authorizations available to the JTF, When standing up a JTF headquarters seek assistance from the. joint agencies that provide training and assistance such as the Joint. Enabling Capabilities Command joint public affairs support element. joint planning support element and 1st Information Operations. Getting the message out is important Appoint a coalition. spokesperson to represent the JTF when disseminating information to. the media and the public This can reduce the perception that the force. is U S dominated with a mission focused solely on the United States. ARCENT TRANSITION TO CJTF OIR IIR,Joint Manning Document. 1 1 Observation A preplanned predesigned joint manning document. JMD for a combined joint task force CJTF headquarters is needed to. facilitate the forming of a contingency headquarters. Discussion From start to finish the process of identifying and manning. the CJTF required approximately 180 days The practicality of having a. deployable scalable and tailorable team within the United States Army. Central Command ARCENT headquarters as the starting point for. building a joint task force JTF headquarters came up several times. Building a team ad hoc is not only labor intensive but also allows for a. great margin of error The idea of having either a fully manned responsive. contingency command post or an on call contingency command post. or crisis action team was a reccurring topic The desire is to have the. capability to move on a moment s notice in response to an event or crisis. The idea of a pre identified roster to fill a CJTF headquarters was suggested. as a remedy to the ad hoc CJTF option A dedicated team of Army Service. component command ASCC personnel to man the cell trained to perform. the duties of a JTF staff in support of a contingency operation would reduce. the reliance on the ad hoc solution Further this concept would minimize. the learning curve needed for team members to gain the required knowledge. and skills for a contingency situation, The force management level FML also impacted the decisions on manning. for the mission Tasks associated with the lines of effort LOEs were. inconsequential to the extent that the restriction placed on the CJTF FML. was not to exceed 300 personnel This personnel threshold took priority. and in essence limited ARCENT staff planners in constructing a functional. headquarters The ARCENT commander mentioned in his comments during. the after action review the need for an off the shelf manning document. Insight To reduce the ad hoc nature of headquarters manning in the early. phase of an operation a standing team or at least previously identified. team that has members who worked together and shared common tactics. techniques and procedures should be retained at the ARCENT level. Presently this ability resides in the ARCENT headquarters in some form. Thinking back to the Army s modular concept modularity a preconfigured. JMD would benefit the Army as a whole Each operation plan would have. a designated JMD package that can be filled at the onset of a crisis or. contingency A thorough mission analysis must be completed to determine. manning levels for each package and operation,CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED.
1 2 Observation Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command Iraq. CJFLCC I and Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve. CJTF OIR had to overcome multiple manning issues, Discussion It took approximately 180 days to fill the JMD and some. billets were never filled Many of the problems encountered in filling the. JMD can be attributed to the amount of Army forces already available in. theater supporting the United States Central Command USCENTCOM. contributing to the overall boots on the ground limits the influence of. political sensitivities related to a resurgence of U S forces in Iraq and the. latency of the request for forces RFF process The number of routine. summer personnel moves exacerbated an already stressed manning situation. for both the forward deployed element and the main command post. ARCENT had a variety of theater enabling commands deployed in the. area of responsibility These commands played a vital role in providing. the manpower needed to form the CJFLCC and CJTF When forming. CJFLCC I and later the CJTF OIR headquarters ARCENT drew personnel. from these enablers to fill the JMD The command s ability to leverage the. capability resident in these entities allowed it to have rapid success. Insight Theater enabling commands played a vital role in the success of. CJFLCC I and the CJTF OIR Without the robust support of these entities. the commands would not have had the rapid successes that they did. 1 3 Observation Many of the ARCENT staff members had dual hatted. roles during support to CJTF OIR, Discussion One lieutenant colonel interviewed had a dual hatted role. as both the key leader engagement chief and ARCENT desk officer. from January through April He had little experience planning deliberate. engagements intended to shape and influence the information environment. His ability to focus on integrating and synchronizing a critical information. related capability into staff planning was diminished by competing. priorities, Insight Conduct a detailed troop to task assessment throughout the staff. to ascertain strengths and weaknesses Determine shortfalls in personnel. and or technical knowledge prioritize responsibilities and then allocate. expertise appropriately Use more seasoned staff to coach newly formed. cells and or tasks not practiced in a garrison environment Leverage both. organic and reachback formations within information related capabilities. such as 1st Information Operations Command to develop a functional. foundation,ARCENT TRANSITION TO CJTF OIR IIR, 1 4 Observation There was a strong need to institute a joint force. requirements board, Discussion At the beginning of the Iraqi crisis USCENTCOM ASCCs all.
submitted immediate RFFs directly to USCENTCOM in accordance with. normal RFF staffing procedures Additionally within ARCENT numerous. staff sections submitted uncoordinated RFFs directly to the deputy director. for special actions and operations J 38 requesting approval from the. operations staff section J 3 and CJFLCC I commander The volume of. immediate requirement requests the lack of requirements coordination. between Service component commands and the established FML all. highlighted the need for a CJFLCC requirements clearinghouse. Insight Upon USCENTCOM s designation of ARCENT as CJFLCC I. the CJFLCC I J 3 must institute a joint force requirements board in order. to solidify a process and forum for submitting validating and tracking. emergent force requirements ensure sufficient socialization deconfliction. and prioritization of component requirements and ensure CJFLCC I. compliance with appropriate FML guidance, 1 5 Observation CJTF OIR took advantage of enablers to bridge initial. shortfalls in manning and expertise, Discussion ARCENT did not initially understand what training support. packages or other enablers were available However once they were. discovered ARCENT took full advantage of external assets to augment. the staff Approximately three months after CJTF OIR was established. it received subject matter experts from the Joint Enabling Capabilities. Command JECC Joint Staff Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force. Development J 7 Deployable Training Division Joint Information. Operations Command and USCENTCOM who temporarily embedded and. provided training to the staff For example the USCENTCOM fires section. deployed personnel to train and certify the CJTF OIR targeting and fires cell. personnel before target approval authorities were transitioned to the CJTF. Insight ASCCs must assess their ability to transition to a CJTF and. understand what enablers are available and how to request them efficiently.

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